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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1985, the ABC Corporation ("ABC") designed, manufactured,
and placed into the stream of commerce a product called the "Won-
der Widget."' Fred Consumer bought a Wonder Widget in 1986.
Later that year, ABC was "bought out" by Gigantic, Incorporated
*** The authors wish to express appreciation to their research assistants, Linda K.
Armstrong and Elizabeth A. Sanchez, for their hard work and dedication, and for the helpful
suggestions that they made during the writing of this article.
* Professor of Law, St. Mary's University School of Law. B.A., University of Texas;
J.D., St. Mary's University; M.C.L., Southern Methodist University; Fulbright Scholar,
Universidad de Rene Gabriel Moreno, Santa Cruz, Bolivia; LL.M., University of Michigan.
** Associate, Haynes and Boone, Fort Worth, Texas; B.S., Texas Christian University,
J.D., St. Mary's University.
1. The scenario presented here is solely for illustrative purposes, and no reference is in-
tended toward any parties now or at any time in the past.
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("Gigantic"), and ABC dissolved shortly thereafter. However, the
successor corporation, 2 Gigantic, continued to manufacture the iden-
tical product and marketed the widgets under the original trade name.
After ABC's dissolution, Fred Consumer was using his widget and
was severely injured when it unexpectedly malfunctioned. Con-
sumer's medical bills began to mount, and as a result of the injury
sustained, he could no longer work full time. The resulting financial
pressures led Consumer to consult his attorney about the feasibility of
a products liability suit. After some brief research, the attorney called
Consumer to give him the bad news: Consumer's Wonder Widget
was manufactured by the ABC Corporation, which had completely
dissolved in 1986. State law precluded any suit against Gigantic, In-
corporated because, although Gigantic was a successor in fact, it was
not a successor as a matter of law. Furthermore, since Consumer's
injuries occurred after the dissolution of ABC, ABC could not be sued
by Consumer. Fred Consumer had therefore become a rarity in the
law of torts: He was a severely injured plaintiff with no available
means of seeking compensation for the harm he had sustained.
While the above scenario is fictitious, unfortunately the plight of
similarly situated plaintiffs today is not. In the fast-paced climate of
today's business world, buy-outs, takeovers, mergers, and other acqui-
sitions of various forms are common occurrences.3 As a consequence
of this corporate turnover, the consumer plaintiff injured while using
a defective product may find that a search for the proper defendant is
futile, simply because the product is now marketed by a different legal
entity. Generally, the consumer has no recourse against the manufac-
turer of the particular product which caused the injury if that manu-
facturer has since dissolved.4 The critical issue becomes whether the
2. The term "successor corporation" is used here and throughout this article to mean any
corporation which has acquired some or all of the assets of another corporation. The term
generally applies, however, to a corporation which has legally succeeded to the rights and the
burdens of a predecessor corporation. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Shawnee In-
dus., 224 F. Supp. 347, 352 (W.D. Okla. 1963).
3. See generally Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Suc-
cessor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441 (1982)(describing business circumstances under
which successor corporations should be liable for product defects).
4. See, e.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977)(even where judgment against
dissolved corporation obtained, collection not possible from former stockholders); Manh Hung
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (11. App. Ct. 1982)(plain-
tiff's loss of remedy because of corporation's dissolution is problem, not solution). But see
Naugher v. Fox River Tractor Co., 446 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (N.D. Miss. 1977)(remedy avail-
able against dissolved corporation under liberal construction of pertinent statute). See gener-
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successor corporation should be held liable. Typically, courts have
resorted to the law of corporations in answering this question.5 There
are essentially three methods of transferring the corporate ownership
of a business,6 and each of the three methods of corporate transfer has
a different impact on the liabilities of the corporations involved. The
effect of judicial reliance on corporate law has been that a plaintiff's
ability to recover is determined by the manner in which the change in
corporate ownership is accomplished.7
The first method of transfering corporate ownership is a statutory
merger or consolidation, which now is strictly regulated in virtually
all jurisdictions.' Stated in simple terms, a merger is accomplished by
one corporation merging into and becoming a part of another existing
corporation. 9 A consolidation occurs when two corporations combine
ally Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault
on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 593-95 (1977)(remedies available to plaintiffs
virtually worthless); Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Suc-
cessor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 444-46 (1982)(discussing successor's liabilities as
consideration in selecting method of corporate transfer).
5. See Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Mich. Ct. App.
1981)(stating traditional rules and exceptions of successor liability); see also Comment, A Res-
toration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J.
441, 443, 447 (1982)(noting shift in judicial attitudes toward traditional rules); cf Jones v.
Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982)(citing cases abandoning
traditional corporate analysis); Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1109 (stating that tradi-
tional corporate law should not be ignored).
6. See generally Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Trans-
ferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 585 (1977)(three methods of
transfer); Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Corpo-
rations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 444 (1982)(introducting three methods of transfer).
7. Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976)(avoidance of
product liability may be only reason to choose cash purchase of assets over merger); see also
Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on
Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 590-93 (1977)(acquisition may be structured as
assets purchase to avoid product liability); Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in
Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 489, 498-99 (1979)(recommending that acquired corporation
be set up as subsidiary to protect buying corporation from potential liability); cf Shannon v.
Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974)(corporations not permitted to
avoid liability by manipulation of corporate entities).
8. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 346, at 983 (3d ed. 1983)("[a]ll current statutes authorize mergers .... ). See
generally TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
9. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977)(one corpora-
tion absorbs another); Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa.
198 1)(one corporation loses existence as separate entity); Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at
1110 (one corporate entity merges into another). See generally N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF
CORPORATIONS § 170, at 613 (2d ed. 1971)(describing processes of merger and consolidation).
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to form a third corporation which did not exist prior to the transac-
tion.' 0 By statute, the surviving or consolidated corporation assumes
all debts and liabilities, including those based on tort, of the "disap-
pearing" entity." The second means of transferring corporate owner-
ship is through the sale of stock by the shareholders. 12 Since the
corporate structure and entity are left undisturbed by a merger, con-
solidation, or transfer of stock, the tort liabilities of the corporation
are also unaffected.1 3 As a result, neither of the first two methods of
transferring ownership affects the injured consumer's right to a
remedy.
The third means by which corporate ownership is changed, how-
ever, is the one which is of immediate concern to our injured hypo-
thetical consumer. Under this method, ownership is transferred when
one corporation sells all, or substantially all, of its assets to another
business.' 4 Under the traditional corporate law rule, a corporation
which purchases the assets of another legal entity does not assume the
debts and liabilities of the selling company."5 Instead, the seller re-
mains liable for settling its own debts prior to its dissolution.'6 This
10. See N. LATTIN, THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 170, at 613 (2d ed. 1971)(corpora-
tion created for purpose of consolidation).
11. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 346, at 982 (3d ed. 1983). Most statutes provide that the "surviving" corpora-
tion in a merger is to assume the rights and obligations of the "constituent" corporations
which are merged into it. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. § 1107(a) (Deering 1977); TEX.
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06(A)(3) (Vernon Supp. 1988); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS
CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(3) (1984).
12. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 341, at 966 (3d ed. 1983).
13. See id. at 966 n.30 (purchasing corporation indirectly assumes seller's liabilities); see
also Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault
on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 588 (1977)(purchaser indirectly liable by be-
coming shareholder in selling corporation).
14. See generally Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Suc-
cessor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 445 (1982).
15. See, e.g., Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973);
Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971); Comstock v.
Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308, 1311 (Kan. 1972).
16. Nardis Sportswear v. Simmons, 147 Tex. 608, 612-13, 218 S.W.2d 451, 453 (corporate
president and directors act as trustees to settle corporate business), modified on other grounds,
219 S.W.2d 779 (1949); cf Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1202
(E.D. Wis. 1979)(transfer of assets by insolvent seller corporation "unable to meet its obliga-
tions to creditors" may be deemed fraud); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev.
1969)(selling corporation has obligation to pay creditors). See generally 15 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 7122-7123 (rev. perm. ed.
1983)(describing general rule and exceptions).
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rule will be applied by the courts unless the facts and circumstances of
the sale warrant the application of some judicially-created excep-
tion. 7 Traditionally, four exceptions to the above stated rule have
been recognized and result in the successor's liability:1 8 (1) where the
successor corporation expressly or impliedly assumes the obligations
of the predecessor; 9 (2) where the purchase is found to be fraudulent
because it is made in an attempt to avoid the liabilities of the
predecessor;20 (3) where the transaction results in the successor cor-
poration being the "mere continuation" of the predecessor; 2' and
(4) where the alleged sale of assets is found to be a de facto merger or
consolidation.22
Originally, corporate law addressed itself to questions regarding the
contractual and tax liabilities of the predecessor.23 However, corpo-
17. See, e.g., Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp.
240, 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(nature and consequences of the transaction may result in liability);
Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 198 1)(factual deter-
mination essential to imposition of successor liability); Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co.,
320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982)(circumstances may warrant succession to liabilities of
predecessor).
18. Numerous cases have stated the general rule and listed the traditional exceptions.
E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 363-64 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 965 (1975); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1152 (1st Cir. 1974); Kloberdanz v.
Joy Mfg., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo. 1968); Tift v. Forage King Indus., 322 N.W.2d 14,
15 (Wis. 1982).
19. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 1977)(successor
assumed liability for five years following acquisition); Bouton v. Litton Indus., 423 F.2d 643,
651 (3d Cir. 1970)(successor impliedly assumed predecessor's liabilities by broad language in
purchase contract).
20. See, e.g., Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D.
Wis. 1979)(assets purchase which renders selling corporation insolvent may be deemed fraud);
Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. 1969)(stock paid to shareholders to exclusion of
creditors may be deemed constructive fraud).
21. See, e.g., Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1152 (successor held liable under mere continuation excep-
tion); Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash Cab Co., 249 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ill. App. Ct.
1969)(applying mere continuation exception); Haney v. Bendix Corp., 279 N.W.2d 544, 545-46
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979)(successor held liable as mere continuation where 90% of sales and
production staff same as predecessor).
22. See, e.g., Sanders v. CEG Corp., 157 Cal. Rptr. 252, 257 (Cal. Ct. App.
1979)(grounds for liability based on merger transaction); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co.,
379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974)(applying de facto merger theory in product liability
action).
23. See Alexander & Baldwin, Inc., v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 240,
243 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)(while rule applies to contracts and tax debts, also long applied to tort
liability). See generally Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and
Successor Corporations, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 441, 444-46 (1982)(describing evolution of corporate
law rules to satisfy transferor's creditors).
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rate law has also been applied to tort issues, including products liabil-
ity.24 Consequently, the purchasing or successor corporation has been
held immune from liability for injuries caused by defective products
manufactured and marketed by its predecessor, in the absence of facts
justifying one of the above exceptions to the general rule.2' The tradi-
tional corporate law rule of successor non-liability and its exceptions
were designed to protect the interests of shareholders and purchasing
corporations while simultaneously guarding the interests of existing
creditors.26 Unfortunately, the corporate law rule leaves the victim of
an accident caused by a defective product in a uniquely disadvanta-
geous position.
Creditors are protected because the predecessor corporation must
satisfy its existing debts and contractual obligations prior to dissolving
the corporation;27 the products liability plaintiff, however, has no
such protection. As illustrated by our hypothetical scenario, a prod-
uct's defect may remain undiscovered until long after the predecessor
corporation has been dissolved, and our injured plaintiff may be left
without a legal remedy.28 This apparent unfairness, coupled with an
increase in litigation of this nature over the last decade, has led to the
judicial recognition of a fifth exception to the traditional corporate
24. See Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Cor-
porations, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 441, 444-46 (1982); see also Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.,
244 N.W.2d 873, 886 (Mich. 1976)(Coleman, J., dissenting)(general rule of non-liability in-
cludes liability for tortious conduct). But see Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250,
1251 (E.D. Wis. 1973)(citing old cases holding torts not covered by exceptions to general rules
of non-liability). See generally Hill, Products Liability of a Successor Corporation-Acquisition
of "Bad Will" with Good Will, 23 IDEA 9, 10-12 (1982).
25. See Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Cor-
porations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 446-47 (1982)(discussing traditional application of corporate
rule and current changes in judicial approach).
26. See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878 (corporate law rule and exceptions for benefit of cred-
itors and shareholders); see also Note, Continued Expansion of Corporate Successor Liability in
the Products Liability Arena, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117, 1121 (1982).
27. See, e.g., Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D.
Wis. 1979)(transfer of assets by insolvent seller corporation unable to fulfill obligations to cred-
itors may be deemed fraud); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. 1969)(selling corpo-
ration has obligation to pay creditors); see also Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict
Products Liability and Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 446 (1982)(corporate law
rule developed to satisfy known creditors at time of transaction).
28. See Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An
Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 592-93 (1977)(cause of action may not
accrue until after dissolution); see also id. at 593 n.46 (discussing availability of cause of action
for personal injury and property damage).
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law rule-the so-called "product line" exception. 29 This fifth excep-
tion, which is our principle subject, encompasses a fact situation in
which the successor corporation has purchased more than the physi-
cal assets of the seller. Rather, the successor has purchased the entire
business and continues to manufacture the original product and place
it into the stream of commerce. The courts which have applied this
new exception have departed significantly from the traditional corpo-
rate law rule and have recognized public policy considerations which
are similar to those underlying the theory of strict products liability.3°
Texas courts have chosen not to adopt the product line exception.3'
Instead, Texas courts have followed the traditional corporate law rule
of successor non-liability and have adopted some of the above-men-
tioned exceptions. 32 As illustrated in our hypothetical, the problem
that remains unresolved by the Texas approach is that certain con-
sumers injured by defective products are denied the right to seek a
remedy in a court of law. This result seems to defy some of the most
fundamental principles underlying the law of products liability.
Before presenting arguments for adoption of the product line excep-
tion, this article will review the corporate law rule and its original
four exceptions. A determination of whether or not Texas courts
should adopt the exception must be based upon a careful examination
of its underlying policy considerations, as well as of the changing
marketplace in recent times, and of the resulting impact on the indi-
vidual consumer.
II. THE TRADITIONAL CORPORATE RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS
Absent statutes to the contrary, whenever one corporate entity
29. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977).
30. See, e.g., Ray, 560 P.2d at 8-9 (considering whether policy supporting strict liability
justified special exception to general rule of non-liability of successor corporation); Turner, 244
N.W.2d at 877 ("Products liability law must govern" as matter of social policy); Ramirez v.
Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 816 (N.J. 1981)(strict liability law to be applied because tradi-
tional corporate law rule too narrow). But see, e.g., Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. &
Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1109 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)(corporate law principles apply in
cases of successor liability); Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb.
1982)(public policy behind products liability not necessarily applicable to successor
corporations).
31. See, e.g., Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.-Corpus
Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(following Griggs); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d
287, 294 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(rejecting product line theory).
32. See generally infra text accompanying notes 223-48.
1988]
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purchases all, or substantially all, of the assets of another concern, the
traditional corporate law rule has been interpreted so as to impose no
tort liability upon the successor corporation. This position has been
justified as a "fundamental principle of justice and fairness, under
which the law imposes responsibility for one's own act and not for the
totally independent acts of others.""a In the context of corporate or
contract law, this justification is probably very sound. The rule pro-
tects the bona fide purchaser of assets who in good faith has given
adequate consideration with no intent to defraud the creditors of the
transferring entity.34 In short, the rule ensures that when one entity
purchases the assets of another, the purchaser will not be saddled with
a liability that was not bargained for in the exchange.
The rule, however, loses its validity in transactions encompassing
more than a mere sale of corporate assets.35 The courts have implic-
itly recognized this shortcoming and, as a result, have formulated four
exceptions to the traditional corporate law rule. These exceptions
have evolved to take notice of the substance rather than the form of
many corporate acquisitions.3 6 Examining each exception, however,
reveals that although each may provide effective protection to the ex-
isting creditors of a corporate entity, no exception is fully responsive
to the needs of an injured plaintiff.37 If a plaintiff is seeking redress
33. Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977).
34. See generally Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Trans-
ferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 591-92 & n.42 (1977)(dis-
cussing bona fide purchaser's good faith and lack of notice of prior claims).
35. See id. at 591 (corporate structure modified in merger or consolidation). The rule is
valid in sale of assets transactions because the selling corporation is theoretically able to meet
its own obligations. See id. at 592.
36. The four exceptions to the traditional corporate law rule apply to transactions which
take the form of an asset purchase, but which are in substance or effect a merger, a continuing
enterprise, or an attempt to defraud creditors. Cf Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F.
Supp. 176, 180-81 (E.D. Pa. 198 l)(considering whether substance of transaction constituted de
facto merger); Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 803 (W.D. Mich. 1974)(lia-
bility of entity cannot be avoided by changing form of property ownership); Turner v. Bitumi-
nous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 875 (Mich. 1976)(cause of action may arise where
continuity of enterprise shown from totality of transaction).
37. E.g., Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9-10 (Cal. 1977)(plaintiff's remedy destroyed
because dissolution "insuperable obstacle" to recovery); Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)(plaintiff denied recovery
under corporate law); Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 878 (plaintiff's only relief from successor); see
also Note, Continued Expansion of Corporate Successor Liability in the Products Liability
Arena, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117, 1144 (1982)(comparing strict liability law and purpose of
providing remedy for plaintiff).
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for injuries caused by a defective product placed into the stream of
commerce by a corporation which is no longer in existence, the tradi-
tional corporate law rule of successor non-liability and its exceptions
often offer little hope.
A. Assumption of Liabilities
The first exception is the most straightforward of the four. It takes
effect whenever, as part of the purchase agreement, the successor cor-
poration expressly agrees to assume not only the existing contractual
obligations of the predecessor, but also its contingent obligations or
liabilities.3 8  The disadvantage to this approach, however, is that the
courts will not find such an assumption of tort liability unless the suc-
ceeding corporation has expressly and unambiguously assumed it.39
Furthermore, any clause in a purchase agreement which expressly ex-
cludes the assumption of liability for defective products is generally
honored by the courts." Under this exception, therefore, purchasing
corporations may, through careful drafting of the purchase agree-
ment, avoid any and all liability for defective products even though
expressly assuming all of the seller's other obligations.4" Predictably,
under this exception, successor corporations are rarely held responsi-
38. See Bippus v. Norton Co., 437 F. Supp. 104, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1977)(holding successor
corporation liable for future product liability claims per terms of agreement of sale).
39. E.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg. Co., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968)(assumption
of specified liabilities did not implicitly include tort liability); Schwartz v. McGraw-Edison
Co., 92 Cal. Rptr. 776, 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1971)(assumption of predecessor's warranties not
implied assumption of product liability when purchase agreement made before inception of
strict products liability); Husak v. Berkel, Inc., 341 A.2d 174, 178-79, 179 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1975)(assuming "all liabilities" not specific enough to include assumption of strict product
liability, especially when strict liability not yet adopted at time of purchase).
40. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 438-40 (7th Cir. 1977)(clause
limiting liability to five years honored by court); National Dairy Prod. Corp. v. Borden Co.,
363 F. Supp. 978, 980 (E.D. Wis. 1973)(successor's refusal to assume liability for patent in-
fringement accepted without question by court because only specific liabilities assumed under
agreement). But see Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153 (1st Cir. 1974)(specific exclu-
sion of tort liability insured purchaser's right of recovery over from predecessor but not bind-
ing on third party plaintiff); Hoche Prods., S.A. v. Jayark Films Corp., 256 F. Supp. 291, 295-
96 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(that defendant had assumed predecessor's liabilities either implied from
statements by employee and attorney or found by de facto merger theory).
41. Compare Bouton v. Litton Indus., 423 F.2d 643, 652 (3d Cir. 1970)(assumption of
product liability claims implied where agreement assumed seller's liabilities) with Kloberdanz
v. Joy Mfg., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D. Colo. 1968)(even though successor assumed seller's
liability, tort liability not included).
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ble for their predecessors' tort liability.42 Consequently, this first ex-
ception affords little relief, if any at all, to the injured consumer in our
hypothetical scenario.
B. Fraudulent Transfer of Assets
Similarly, the second exception to the traditional corporate law rule
of successor non-liability rarely provides a remedy in a products lia-
bility suit.43 This exception, designed to prevent a fraudulent transfer
of assets from one legal entity to another, was formulated primarily to
protect existing creditors of the selling corporation.' The exception
is generally applied whenever a transfer of assets is made from one
corporation to another for inadequate or no consideration.45 If such
an exchange leaves the predecessor without available means to satisfy
its debts, the transaction is deemed to operate as a fraud upon the
creditors of the selling company.46 The purchasing entity, charged
with constructive knowledge of the fraud due to the inadequate con-
sideration given, is held liable to the defrauded creditors.4 7  Obvi-
ously, this exception would afford much protection to the existing
42. See generally Note, Continued Expansion of Corporate Successor Liability in the Prod-
ucts Liability Arena, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117, 1120-22, 1128-30 (1982)(general discussion
of limited application of the exceptions to the rule); Comment, The Extension of Products
Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV.
584, 596 & n.64 (1977)(limited application of the assumption exception).
43. Hill, Products Liability of a Successor Corporation-Acquisition of "Bad Will" with
Good Will, 32 DEF. L.J. 55, 58 (1983); see also Wolffv. Shreveport Gas, Elec. Light & Power
Co., 70 So. 789, 794-95 (La. 1916)(gas company held liable for injury due to explosion from
leaking pipe where subsequent transfer of corporate assets found fraudulent for lack of
consideration).
44. See Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An
Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 597 (1977).
45. See Economy Ref. & Serv. Co. v. Royal Nat'l Bank, 97 Cal. Rptr. 706, 710 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971)(new corporation held liable where transfer without consideration was attempt to
defraud creditor).
46. See, e.g., Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D.
Wis. 1979)(transaction rendering seller insolvent may be deemed fraud); Bazan v. Kux Mach.
Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973)(defendant buyer's case stronger because rights
of seller's creditors not impaired); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. 1969)(construc-
tive fraud may be found where buyer issues stock to seller's stockholders to detriment of credi-
tors); see also Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-
An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 597 (1977)(inadequate consideration
for corporate assets essence of fraudulent transfer).
47. See Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An
Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 597 n.69 (1977)(citing Lamb v. Leroy
Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. 1969)).
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creditors of a going concern, but by its nature is of little use to the
consumer who is injured after the manufacturing corporation is
dissolved.
These first two exceptions to the traditional corporate rule of suc-
cessor non-liability are of limited use in an action wherein a plaintiff
seeks to impose tort liability on a successor corporation. The last two
exceptions, however, are somewhat more useful to an injured plaintiff.
C. Mere Continuation
The third exception, the so-called "mere continuation" exception,
generally is acknowledged whenever the successor corporation more
closely resembles a reorganized version of its predecessor than an en-
tirely new corporate entity.48 Where a corporation is merely continu-
ing the same business under the different name of a successor, it can
be charged with the legal obligations incurred prior to its reorganiza-
tion.49 This would, by necessity, include liability for injuries caused
by defective products. In order to recognize a continuing enterprise
of this sort, courts often look for the presence of certain factors which
would indicate a common identity between the successor corporation
and the legal entity which preceded it.50 Such evidence of common
identity would include, but not be limited to, the existence of identical
stockholders, the same officers, and similar directors. 51 As in the case
of fraudulent transfers, the court will also question the adequacy of
48. See, e.g., Armour-Dial, 469 F. Supp. at 1201-02 (mere continuation exists where new
corporation merely "new hat" for old entity); City of Altoona v. Richardson Gas & Oil Co.,
106 P. 1025, 1025 (Kan. 1910)(liability of successor grounded on "continuance of the original
corporation under a new guise"); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.w.2d 873, 892
(Mich. 1976)(Coleman, J., dissenting)(continuity of shareholders is, in effect, corporate re-
organization).
49. E.g., In re Johnson-Hart Co., 34 F.2d 183, 184 (D. Minn. 1929)(where new corpora-
tion is mere continuation of old business, it assumes liability for predecessor's debts); Richard-
son Gas & Oil Co., 106 P. at 1025 (successor liable where new corporation mere continuation
of old).
50. See, e.g., Armour-Dial, Inc., 469 F. Supp. at 1201 (continuity based on "common
identity" of predecessor and successor)(quoting Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440
(7th Cir. 1977)); Bergman & Lefkow Ins. Agency v. Flash Cab Co., 249 N.E.2d 729, 737 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1969)(same officers, shareholders, location supported finding of liability for predeces-
sor's fraudulent representations).
51. E.g., Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1981);
Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1974), vacated and remanded on other
grounds, 517 F.2d 1398 (3d Cir. 1975); Tift v. Forage King Indus., 322 N.W.2d 14, 17 (Wis.
1982). See generally 1 L. FRUMER & M. FREIDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2.06[2][c]
(1987)(summarizing mere continuation exception).
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the consideration given in the exchange.52 Such factors have been
critical in determining whether the succeeding business entity is an
entirely new going concern or a mere continuation of the preceding
corporate entity. Curiously enough, however, in the leading products
liability case applying the mere continuation exception, these elements
were missing.
5 3
In Cyr v. B. Offen & Co. ,- the court found that the existing corpo-
ration was, for purposes of tort liability for a defective product, a
mere continuation of its predecessor.55 In the case, the B. Often Com-
pany, a sole proprietorship, manufactured and marketed printing
presses and ovens.5 6 In 1959, Rumford Printing Company purchased
one of Offen's products.57 Following the death of Mr. Offen in 1962,
several of his former employees formed a corporation which
purchased all of the sole proprietorship's assets.58 The sales agree-
ment was supported by adequate consideration,5 9 and included a pro-
vision that the newly formed corporation would operate in
substantially the same manner as the preceding business." The con-
tract also expressly excluded the successor's assumption of the prede-
cessor's tort liabilities. 61 The new company, however, continued its
operations at the same location and with virtually the same employees
and managers.62 It also represented itself in all advertising as an
ongoing operation 63 and, in addition, honored all existing contractual
and service obligations, which happened to include servicing and
52. See Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An
Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 600 (1977)(adequacy of consideration
most important aspect of mere continuation exception).
53. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974). The predecessor was a sole
proprietorship whose owner had died. See id. at 1151. Thus there was no continuity of stock-
holders or directors. Additionally, the consideration given was apparently adequate. See id. at
1152 ("good faith sale at arm's length").
54. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974).
55. See id. at 1154 (successor a mere continuation "in the most real sense").
56. See id. at 1151.
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 1152.
60. See id. at 1151 (same business policies and practices continued). The products were
by agreement to be manufactured by the new corporation in the same manner as they had been
by the sole proprietorship. See id.
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id. (company's advertisements claimed business forty years old).
[Vol. 19:621
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
renovating the equipment sold to Rumford.'
In 1969, ten years after the equipment had been purchased and
seven years after the new corporation had come into existence, two
employees of the Rumford Printing Company were injured while
cleaning an allegedly defective oven which had been purchased from
the B. Offen sole proprietorship. 65 In imposing liability on the succes-
sor corporation for these injuries, the court in Cyr stressed that this
result was brought about because the new company was nothing more
than a mere continuation of the prior business. 66 Furthermore, the
court concluded that the same policy considerations which support
strict products liability as promulgated by the Restatement of Torts
section 402A 67 would also support the imposition of tort liability
upon a successor corporation in a case of this sort. The court stated:
The manufacturer's successor, carrying over the experience and exper-
tise of the manufacturer, is likewise in a better position than the con-
sumer to gauge the risks and the costs of meeting them. The successor
knows the product, is as able to calculate the risk of defects as the pred-
ecessor, is in position to insure therefor and reflect such cost in sale
negotiations, and is the only entity capable of improving the quality of
the product.6"
From this case, it seems clear that in situations where one business
entity is a mere continuation of another, the courts may overlook the
traditional corporate law rule of successor non-liability and impose
tort liability for injuries caused by defective products. This position,
which considers all relevant facts and circumstances, acknowledges
the substance of the transaction over its form. The exception allows
an injured party relief where there is in fact no remedy, and, in this
respect, the exception operates as a measure of equitable relief. The
courts, nevertheless, justify this position for the same reasons that
they impose strict liability.
64. See id. Defendant serviced Rumford Press's old dryers, but was not under contract to
do so. Id.
65. See id. at 1148. The employees contended that the ovens were defective for lack of
"fail-safe" safety features. See id. at 1149.
66. See id. at 1154.
67. See id. The court enumerated the same policy reasons as those underlying section
402A of the Restatement without specifically identifying the sources. See infra text accompa-
nying note 68; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965).
68. See Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154.
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D. De Facto Merger or Consolidation
The finding of a de facto merger or consolidation is the fourth and
final traditional exception to the corporate law rule of successor non-
liability. Courts apply this theory to transactions which purport to
encompass the sale of corporate assets but which in fact have elements
more characteristic of a merger or consolidation.69 It is important to
make a distinction between these two actions because in a merger, the
successor corporation assumes the liabilities of its predecessor,7 °
whereas, as already noted, in an ordinary purchase agreement the cor-
porate law rule of successor non-liability becomes applicable.
The reasons for this important difference are traceable to the differ-
ing nature and consequences of the two types of transfers. When-
ever the assets of one corporation, for example, are purchased by an-
other corporation, the two entities theoretically remain intact. 71 Both
before and after the sale, the corporations are "strangers, ' '72 and as
such, each has an ability as well as an obligation to satisfy its own
respective debts and obligations.73 A merger or consolidation, on the
other hand, presupposes the concurrent dissolution of the selling cor-
69. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa.
198 1)(plaintiff alleged de facto merger because assets sale resembled de jure merger); Shannon
v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (W.D. Mich. 1974)(de facto merger found
where transaction was something "other than an ordinary purchase of assets"); Turner v. Bitu-
minous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 892 (Mich. 1976)(Coleman, J., dissenting)(de facto
merger to be found where result of asset sale same as statutory merger).
70. See generally H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 346, at 982 (3d ed. 1983)(assumption of liability in merger acquisi-
tions prescribed by state's corporate statutes).
71. In actions alleging de facto merger, the continued existence of the predecessor corpo-
ration for even a short period of time following the sale has often defeated a finding in favor of
the claimant. E.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 440 (7th Cir. 1977)(no dissolu-
tion where corporation's distinct identity maintained); Bazan v. Kux Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp.
1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973)(no dissolution where entity operated as independent company for
ten months after sale); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y.
1983)("meagre" entity surviving sale precludes finding mere continuation).
72. E.g., Jacobs, 512 F. Supp. at 181; Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg., 288 F. Supp. 817, 821 (D.
Colo. 1968); Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 881-82; McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 104
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970), aff'd, 288 A.2d 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1972).
73. Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An
Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 591-92 (1977). Implicit in the general
rule of non-liability is the selling corporation's ability to settle its own debts prior to dissolu-
tion. E.g., Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1202 (E.D. Wis.
1979)(sale of assets by insolvent seller corporation unable to fulfill obligations to creditors may
be deemed fraud); Lamb v. Leroy Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 27 (Nev. (1969)(selling corporation has
obligation to pay creditors).
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poration.74 The original entity is dissolved upon completion of the
transaction or as soon thereafter as possible," and, as a result, the
selling corporation relinquishes its separate identity and becomes part
of the successor.76 This means that all debts, obligations, and, for
purposes of this discussion, tort liabilities become the responsibility of
the surviving corporate entity.77 The successor's assumption of liabil-
ity derives in part from the fact that in a merger or consolidation the
shareholders of the selling corporation usually surrender their stock
in exchange for shares in the new company.78 This exchange creates
the expectation that even though the predecessor will be dissolved, the
operation will continue to exist as a different entity but with the same
shareholders. 79 Therefore, it is logical that the existing obligations
continue as well.
The underlying distinction between these two types of transactions
becomes very important in a scenario such as the hypothetical one
presented at the beginning of this discussion, for if the transfer in
question is a sale of assets, the traditional corporate law rule of suc-
74. See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich.
1974)(merger requires absorption and "practically contemporaneous" dissolution of acquired
entity)(citing McKee, 264 A.2d at 103). Merger statutes generally provide for the dissolution
of the entity which is absorbed. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06(A)(2) (Vernon
Supp. 1988); REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(1) (1984); see also H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, LAWS Of CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 346, at 980
(3d ed. 1983)(one corporation disappears).
75. See Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Cor-
porations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 444 (1982)(absorbed corporation loses "corporate identity").
76. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06(A)(I)-(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
The statute continues: "Such surviving or new corporation shall have all the rights, privileges,
immunities, and powers and shall be subject to all the duties and liabilities of a corporation
organized under this Act." Id. at (A)(3).
77. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.06(A)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1988); REVISED
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(3) (1984); see also Hoche Prods., S.A. v. Jayark
Films Corp., 256 F. Supp. 291, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)(stating rule under New York corporation
statute); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS EN-
TERPRISES § 346, at 982 (3d ed. 1983)(liability assumed by absorption). See generally Com-
ment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on
Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 587 (1977)(general discussion of effects of merger
and significance to product liability complainant).
78. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ENTERPRISES § 346, at 982 (3d. 1983)(surviving corporation buys shares of disappearing cor-
poration); see also REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(6) (1984).
79. See Comment, A Restoration ofCertainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Cor-
porations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 444 (1982). By absorption into another corporation, the ac-
quired business continues its existence as a constituent part of the entity which has "survived"
the acquisition. Id.
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cessor non-liability applies and our injured plaintiff remains remedi-
less. If, on the other hand, the transfer is a merger, the remaining
entity remains liable for all obligations, including the tort liability, of
the selling company.
Confronted with a transfer of assets which is alleged to be a
sale/purchase agreement, the courts will deem the transfer a de facto
merger and impose liability accordingly if the evidence is sufficiently
characteristic of a merger.8 0 To arrive at this conclusion, however, it
is necessary to establish four definite patterns in each proceeding."1
First, there must be a continuation of the enterprise.8 2 For example,
the successor must retain essentially the same management team and
personnel, operate the business in the same general manner, and re-
main in the same location. 3 Secondly, there must be a continuity of
80. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa.
198 l)(de facto merger not found where transaction did not resemble merger); Shannon v. Sa-
muel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974)(transaction resembling merger
held de facto merger); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 888 (Mich.
1976)(Coleman, J., dissenting)("corporate merger in fact" can be achieved without complying
with merger statute)(quoting Applestein v. United Board & Carton Corp., 159 A.2d 146, 152
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 161 A.2d 474 (N.J. 1960)). See generally H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 341, at 963
n.16 (3d ed. 1983).
81. Opinions discussing the de facto merger exception in a number of jurisdictions list all
four requirements discussed in the text. E.g., Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801 (citing McKee v.
Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 103-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970)); Manh Hung
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1106-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982);
Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879 (citing Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801). Other jurisdictions, how-
ever, emphasize only some of the factors or some aspects of one or more factors. See infra note
88.
82. The "continuation of the enterprise" factor seems to have caused some blurring of the
distinctions between the "mere continuation" exception and the de facto merger doctrine,
since it is a requirement under both theories. For instance, courts and commentators are in
disagreement as to the classification or basis of the decision in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
Co., 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976). Compare Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d
195, 198 (N.Y. 1983)(continuity of enterprise) and Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320
N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982)(continuity of enterprise) and Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp.,
314 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)(continuity of enterprise) and Comment, A Resto-
ration of Certainty. Strict Products Liability and Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441,
449 & n.66 (1982)(mere continuation exception) with Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1107
(de facto merger) and Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 888 (Coleman, J., dissenting)(majority found de
facto merger) and Note, Products Liability--Successor Corporations-Liability for Defects in
Predecessor's Products, 33 U. KAN. L. REV. 791, 796 (1985)(de facto merger).
83. E.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977)(considering retention
of employees and managers); Jacobs, 512 F. Supp. at 181 (no liability under de facto merger
where officers and employees not made available to purchasing corporation); Bazan v. Kux
Mach. Co., 358 F. Supp. 1250, 1252 (E.D. Wis. 1973)(no liability because no commonality of
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shareholders.84 This is usually the case when the purchasing corpora-
tion pays for the assets of the other company with its own stock, 5
resulting in the predecessor's shareholders becoming owners of the
successor corporation.8 6 Thirdly, there must be a dissolution of the
predecessor as soon as legally and practically possible after the "sale"
of its assets.8 7 Fourthly, the successor must assume those liabilities
and obligations of the predecessor as are needed to ensure a normal,
uninterrupted continuation of the business.88 The presence of these
executives, management personnel, or officers); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg., 288 F. Supp. 817, 822
(D. Colo. 1968)(de facto merger requires "mixture" of shareholders and officers).
84. See, e.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439-40 (7th Cir. 1977)(no de
facto merger unless purchaser corporation makes payment in stock); Kloberdanz, 288 F. Supp.
at 822 (de facto merger requires "mixture" of shareholders and officers of selling and purchas-
ing corporations); Manh Hung Nguyen, 433 N.E.2d at 1111 (shareholder continuity most im-
portant element of de facto merger); Tift v. Forage King Indus., 322 N.W.2d 14, 21 (Wis.
1982)(de facto merger requires that selling corporation's shareholders receive shares of pur-
chaser's stock).
85. Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 181 (E.D. Pa. 1981)(no de facto
merger unless purchasing corporation pays with its own stock); Armour-Dial, Inc. v. Alkar
Eng'g Corp., 469 F. Supp. 1198, 1201 (E.D. Wis. 1979)(de facto merger found only if consider-
ation given for seller's assets is shares of purchaser's stock). However, whether the considera-
tion is to be entirely of stock is not clear. Compare Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 7 (Cal.
1977)(transaction de facto merger where entire consideration is shares of buying corporation's
stock) with Wilson v. Fare Well Corp., 356 A.2d 458, 466 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976)(de
facto merger upheld even though successor purchased predecessor's assets with both cash and
stock).
86. Once the stock transfer is made, the stockholders of the selling corporation, or prede-
cessor, become owners or shareholders of the new corporation. See Travis, 565 F.2d at 447 (no
continuity of shareholder interests without stock transfer); Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 890 (Cole-
man, J., dissenting)(stock transfers create continuity of shareholder interest from selling com-
pany to purchasing company).
87. See, e.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1974)
(merger requires absorption and "practically contemporaneous" dissolution of acquired entity)
(citing McKee v. Harris-Seybold Co., 264 A.2d 98, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1970));
Bazan, 358 F. Supp. at 1252 (selling corporation's dissolution after ten months not immediate
enough for de factor merger); Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y.
1983)(successor corporation not liable under corporate law exceptions where predecessor sur-
vived the purchase but discontinued operations). But see Ray, 560 P.2d at 6-7 (dissolution of
predecessor one month following purchase apparently insignificant factor in considering de
factor merger). Courts have also found that where a predecessor was in the process of foreclo-
sure or liquidation prior to the assets sale, the buying corporation is not liable for the obliga-
tions of the sellers. E.g., Comstock v. Great Lakes Distrib. Co., 496 P.2d 1308, 1312-13 (Kan.
1972); Pelc v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 618-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
88. Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976); Shannon,
379 F. Supp. at 801 (citing McKee, 264 A.2d at 103-05); Freeman v. White Way Sign & Main-
tenance Co., 403 N.E.2d 495, 502 (I11. App. Ct. 1980)(citing Hernandez v. Johnson Press
Corp., 388 N.E.2d 778, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)); Pelc, 314 NW.2d at 618 (enumerating list of
elements in Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879, but characterizing Turner decision as based on mere
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four factors in a sale of assets may lead to a finding of de facto merger
for purposes of product liability. 9 The absence of any one element
can be fatal to a plaintiff's case, 90 with the result that the injured indi-
vidual, such as the one in our hypothetical scenario, is left without a
remedy.
These principles are well exemplified in Shannon v. Samuel Lang-
ston Company.9 In that case, the plaintiff, Shannon, was injured on
the job in 1967 by a machine that had been manufactured by the Sa-
muel M. Langston Company.92 In 1966, a corporation called Harris
Intertype Corporation had purchased all of the assets as well as the
name of The Langston Company,93 paying for the transfer entirely
with its own stock.94 The federal district court found that all ele-
ments of a de facto merger were present in this "purchase" and held
that the successor was liable for the injuries caused by the defective
product placed into the stream of commerce by the predecessor.95
First, the court determined that the general business operation of the
continuation theory). Assuming such obligations is another indication of an intent to continue
the enterprise without pause. See Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801 n. 1. Some courts (most nota-
bly those of California) have failed to consider this factor in discussions of de facto merger,
perhaps because it is unnecessary to do so in the absence of other elements. See, e.g., Jacobs,
512 F. Supp. at 180-81 (assumption of obligations in de facto merger context not discussed
where continutiy of enterprise and shareholders and immediate dissolution of predecessor ab-
sent)(applying California law); Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820 (D. Colo.
1968)(de facto merger criteria not satisfied in absence of common officers and where separate
entities existed after transfer) (applying California law); Ray, 560 P.2d at 7 (only element of de
facto merger mentioned concerned inadequate consideration or stock as consideration); Ortiz
v. South Bend Lathe, 120 Cal. Rptr. 556, 558 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)(de facto merger not found
in absence of common officers and where separate entities existed after transfer).
89. E.g., Knapp v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 369 (3rd Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 801.
90. See, e.g., Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977)(transaction not
merger absent continuity of shareholders); Leannais v. Cincinnati, Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th
Cir. 1977)(where payment not in stock, de facto merger elements not satisfied); Lamb v. Leroy
Corp., 454 P.2d 24, 26 (Nev. 1969)(no de facto merger where both companies maintained
separate identities). But see Long John Silver's Inc. v. Architectural Eng'g Prods. Co., 520 F.
Supp. 753, 758-59 (W.D. Pa. 1981)(while dissolution of predecessor is required, continuity of
business enterprise may not be). "Not all of these factors are needed to demonstrate a merger;
rather, these factors are only indicators that tend to show a de facto merger." Menacho v.
Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128, 133 (D.N.J. 1976).
91. 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974).
92. See id. at 798 (employee lost left arm while working with cardboard printer-slotter).
93. Id. at 799.
94. See id. at 799, 801 (Harris stock used to satisfy predecessor's debts and distributed to
predecessor's shareholders).
95. See id. at 801-03.
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purchased entity had continued in the same location with the same
personnel, and had been operated under the same management.
96
Also, the Harris Intertype stock used to purchase the Langston assets
had been distributed to Langston's shareholders after the company's
debts had been satisfied. This created a continuity of ownership.97
The third element was also present in that the predecessor changed its
name and discontinued ordinary business operations soon after the
sale.98 Finally, the court found that Harris Intertype had expressly
assumed all of Langston's debts necessary to continue the normal un-
interrupted cycle of business operations.99 On these facts, the court
reasoned that Harris Intertype had received all of the benefits of a
going concern and should therefore also assume its ordinary costs.'0°
These costs included liability for damages caused by defective prod-
ucts placed into the stream of commerce by the predecessor. 10 More-
over, the court noted that the successor had "deliberately evaded"
statutory merger requirements by shaping the acquisition as a
purchase of assets,"°2 and that avoiding liability by manipulation of
corporate entities was against public policy.103 This case presents an
example of a de facto merger pure and simple. The facts and circum-
stances presented a "perfect" opportunity for the court's imposition of
the fourth exception to the traditional corporate rule of successor
non-liability.
Two years after the Shannon decision, however, the Michigan
Supreme Court expanded the de facto merger doctrine as it applied to
products liability actions by eliminating an element which previously
had been regarded as essential: In Turner v. Bituminous Casualty
Company,"°4 the court dispensed with the requirement of an exchange
of stock. 105 Instead, the court determined that the basic continuity of
96. See id. at 801.
97. See id.
98. See id. at 799, 801.
99. Id. at 801.
100. Id. at 802.
101. See id. (sales price includes projected products liability insurance premiums).
102. Id.
103. See id. at 802-03 ("enlightened social policy" not contrary to "favorable corporate
climate").
104. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
105. See id. at 880 (absence of stock as consideration not dispositive); see also id. at 883
(cash payment rather than stock transfer mere difference in degree).
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the enterprise should be the determining factor. 106 In that case, the
plaintiff Turner, like Shannon, was injured on the job by a machine
whose manufacturer had been acquired by Harris Intertype Corpora-
tion. '7 The purchase agreement and circumstances were also sub-
stantially the same as those in Shannon.'° There was, however, one
major difference. In Turner, Harris had acquired the company for
cash instead of stock.'09 As previously noted, the traditional position
has been that a de factor merger may not be found without a transfer
of stock. The Turner court, however, found the absence of an ex-
change of stock inconclusive. 0 The majority decided that where
other circumstances showing a continuity of the enterprise are so per-
vasive as to dominate the transaction, the form of payment should
have no effect on the successor's tort liability."' To the injured plain-
tiff, technical distinctions as to the form of acquisition are meaning-
less;112 the more cogent inquiry is whether the successor held itself out
to the public as a continuing enterprise."' Accordingly, the Turner
court stated that even absent an exchange of stock, a successor should
be held liable for the predecessor's defective products where the
purchasing corporation held itself out as a continuing enterprise and
where other elements of de facto merger are present." 4
Shannon and Turner offer ample authority for the proposition that
when confronted with a transfer of assets that is alleged to be a
sales/purchase agreement, some courts will now look to a variety of
factors in determining whether a de facto merger should be imposed.
Some of the most important of these factors are the continuity of the
enterprise, the rapid dissolution of the predecessor, the assumption of
debts necessary to continue uninterrupted operations, and whether
the successor has held itself out as a continuing concern. Moreover,
106. See id. at 882 ("continuity is the watch word").
107. See id. at 875 (plaintiff's hands amputated as result of injury from power press man-
ufactured by T.W. & G.B. Sheridan Co.).
108. See generally id. at 875-76 (summarizing terms of purchase agreement).
109. See id. at 876 (consideration was $6.38 million).
110. See id. at 880. Noting that the actual shareowners at the time the product was
manufactured are likely not the same shareowners as at the time of the corporation's sale, the
court stated that "continuity" of shareholders is more theoretical than real. Id.
111. See id. at 882 (justice offended if liability avoided where business property, opera-
tions, policy, and personnel continuous).
112. See id. at 878.
113. See id. at 882 (corporation must be successor for both sales and liabilities).
114. See id. at 883-84.
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both Turner and Shannon reflect a growing emphasis on the public
policy supporting strict products liability law"' and its insistence on
compensation of injured plaintiffs. The court in each decision noted
that traditional corporate law principles governing successor liability
were originally designed to protect creditors, shareholders, and corpo-
rate entities,11 6 but that these general non-liability principles could
also be manipulated so as to cut off any available remedy for the prod-
uct liability plaintiff." 7 This conundrum, however, has had positive
results. It was instrumental in bringing about the newest exception to
the corporate law rule of successor non-liability, the product line
exception.
III. PRODUCT LINE LIABILITY: THE "NEW" EXCEPTION
The mere continuation rule, the third exception to the corporate
law rule of successor non-liability discussed above" 8 and enunciated
in Cyr v. B. Offen & Company," 9 was further extended by the
Supreme Court of California in Ray v. Alad Corporation.20 Ray is the
seminal case in which the "product line" exception was formulated
and stands for the proposition that in some cases liability should be
imposed upon a successor corporation for a defective product sold by
the predecessor. 2' This exception focuses not upon whether the ex-
isting company is a mere continuation of the former one, but instead
upon whether the predecessor's actual product line has been contin-
ued. 22 In other words, this exception differs from the mere continua-
tion rule by focusing specifically upon the continuation of the product
instead of upon the continuity of the business.
In Ray, the plaintiff was injured when he fell from a defective lad-
der which had been manufactured by the Alad Corporation (Alad
115. See id. at 877-79; 882-83 (discussing evolution of products liability law in legislatiure
and courts); see also Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802-03 (W.D. Mich.
1974)(analyzing social and economic policies).
116. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 878 (Mich. 1976); see also
Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 802.
117. Cf Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 882-83 (corporation may employ piecemeal divestiture to
escape liability); Shannon, 379 F. Supp. at 802-03 (corporation may attempt to avoid liability
by "shuffling paper").
118. See supra text accompanying notes 48-53.
119. 501 F.2d 1145 (1st Cir. 1974); see also supra text accompanying notes 54-68.
120. 560 P.2d 3, 7-8 (Cal. 1977)(discussing limitations of mere continuation exception).
121. See id. at 11.
122. See id. at 10-11; see also Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 822 (N.J. 1981).
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I). 123 Prior to the damaging event, however, Alad I had sold all of its
assets to the Lighting Maintenance Corporation (Alad II) and subse-
quently dissolved as a business entity.' 24 In accordance with their
purchase plan, Alad II had continued to manufacture and place into
the stream of commerce the identical ladders, using the original
"Alad" trade name. 125 The injured plaintiff filed suit, seeking to im-
pose strict tort liability upon the successor corporation. 126 Analyzing
the facts and applying the law under the traditional corporate law
rule, the trial court granted Alad II's motion for summary judg-
ment. 
12 7
On appeal, the California Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
judgment. 128  In reaching this decision, the court first examined the
rationale underlying the general corporate law rule of successor non-
liability 129 and proceeded to give an extensive analysis of the prior
case law.' 3 The court's conclusion was that none of the four tradi-
tional exceptions applied to the particular transaction in this case.' 3'
In addition, the court concluded that it was not prepared to expand
these existing theories, nor did the court find that an additional corpo-
rate law exception was warranted. 3 2 Instead, the court decided to
abandon the traditional approach in favor of a products liability anal-
ysis. 133 Examining prior cases, including the landmark decision of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products,134 the court determined that pol-
icy considerations supporting products liability for manufacturers and
sellers were equally applicable to successor corporations. 135 Conse-
123. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 5 (plaintiff fell from ladder during course of employment).
124. See id. at 5-6. Alad I sold all its assets, including the manufacturing plant, machin-
ery, raw materials, semi-finished goods, and office fixtures to Alad II. See id.
125. See id. at 6.
126. See id. at 4.
127. See id. at 5 (successor had not manufactured ladder); see also infra text accompany-
ing notes 129-31.
128. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 11 (Cal. 1977).
129. See generally id. at 7-8.
130. See generally id. at 7-9.
131. Id. at 8.
132. See id.
133. See id. at 8 (policies supporting strict tort liability may justify exception to corporate
law of successor non-liability).
134. 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)(landmark case recognizing strict products liability cause of
action).
135. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 8 (Cal. 1977). The court reasoned that "the
protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading
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quently, a new exception based upon principles of tort rather than cor-
porate law was appropriate. The court then held that "a party which
acquires a manufacturing business and continues the output of its line
of products ... assumes strict tort liability for defects ... of the same
product line previously manufactured and distributed by the entity
from which the business was acquired."' 36 The court reasoned:
Justification for imposing strict liability upon a successor to a manufac-
turer under the circumstances here presented rests upon (1) the virtual
destruction of the plaintiff's remedies against the original manufacturer
caused by the successor's acquisition of the business, (2) the successor's
ability to assume the original manufacturer's risk-spreading role, and
(3) the fairness of requiring the successor to assume a responsibility for
defective products that was a burden necessarily attached to the original
manufacturer's good will being enjoyed by the successor in the contin-
ued operation of business.
1 37
Like the Shannon decision discussed above, 38 Ray placed great em-
phasis on the "good will" justification, stating:
Finally, the imposition upon Alad II of liability for injuries from Alad
I's defective products is fair and equitable in view of Alad II's acquisi-
tion of Alad I's trade name, good will, and customer lists, its continuing
to produce the same line of ladders, and its holding itself out to poten-
tial customers as the same enterprise. This deliberate albeit legitimate
exploitation of Alad I's established reputation as a going concern manu-
facturing a specific product line gave Alad II a substantial benefit which
its predecessor could not have enjoyed without the burden of potential
liability for injuries from previously manufactured units. Imposing this
liability upon successor manufacturers in the position of Alad II not
only causes the 'one who takes the benefit [to] bear the burden. . .' but
precludes any windfall to the predecessor that might otherwise result
from (1) the reflection of an absence of such successor liability in an
enhanced price paid by the successor for the business assets and (2) the
liquidation of the predecessor resulting in avoidance of its responsibility
for subsequent injuries from its defective products.
139
throughout society of the cost of compensating them" properly justifies successor liability. Id.
(quoting Price v. Shell Oil Co., 466 P.2d 722, 725-26 (Cal. 1970)(en banc)).
136. Id. at 11.
137. Id. at 8-9 (emphasis in original).
138. See Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797 (W.D. Mich. 1974); see also
supra text accompanying notes 91-103.
139. See Ray, 560 P.2d at 10-11 (citations omitted). The exception enunciated in Ray
was expanded a step further in Rawlings v. D.M. Oliver, Inc., 159 Cal. Rptr. 119 (Cal. Ct. App.
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The "new" exception was born. Since Ray, the product line excep-
tion has become well established in California, but has not yet been
widely accepted by other jurisdictions. 4 ° In 1981, the product line
exception was adopted by the courts of Pennsylvania and New
Jersey.141 Both tribunals suggested that the new theory, founded
upon the policies supporting strict products liability,' 42 was preferable
to a judicial expansion of the traditional corporate law exceptions. 143
When adopting the exception, the Pennsylvania court also expanded
the significant factors that should be examined in applying the excep-
tion to a particular set of facts.'" At least two other jurisdictions,
Washington and New York, have implicitly supported this new ex-
ception, but have not yet adopted it. 145 The Washington Supreme
Court, while recognizing the product line exception as being
consistent with Washington law, was reluctant to adopt the new the-
ory under inappropriate circumstances.146  Similarly, the New York
Court of Appeals evinced some degree of approval of the exception's
1979). In Rawlings, the court imposed successor corporation liability despite the fact that the
successor did not continue to manufacture the identical product. See id. at 124. The court
stated that "where one takes the benefit one ordinarily should bear the burden" and, further-
more, "unlike plaintiff, [the successor] was in a position to protect itself from loss by expressly
providing for that risk in the bargain it made with [the] sellers." Id.
140. See Sell, Successor Corporation's Liability for Defective Products of Its Transferor-
The Product Line Exception, 4 J.L. & COM. 65, 71 n.29 (1984). The courts of Alabama, Flor-
ida, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nebraska, Ohio, and Wisconsin, among others, have rejected
the product line exception. Id.
141. See Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 825 (N.J. 1981); Dawejko v. Jorgen-
sen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); see also Nieves v. Bruno Sherman
Corp., 431 A.2d 826, 830 (N.J. 1981)(companion case to Ramirez which also adopted product
line exception).
142. See Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (citing Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 825).
143. See id.; see also Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 819 (focus should be continuity of manufactur-
ing operation rather than continuity of ownership and management).
144. See Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 111 (combining the Cyr, Turner, Knapp, and Ray require-
ments). The court determined that the following factors were significant to its imposition of
product line liability:
whether the successor corporation advertised itself as an ongoing enterprise; or whether it
maintained the same product, name, personnel, property, and clients; or whether it ac-
quired the predecessor corporation's name and good will, and required the predecessor to
dissolve.
Id. (citations omitted). The court further noted that whether the Ray three-part test was met
would be a consideration. Id.
145. See Schumacher v. Richards Shear Co., 451 N.E.2d 195, 198 (N.Y. 1983); Meisel v.
M & N Modem Hydraulic Press Co., 645 P.2d 689, 692 n.1 (Wash. 1982)(rule of Ray
salutary).
146. See Meisel, 645 P.2d at 692 n. 1.
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underlying policy rationale but declined to adopt it.'47 Finally, as
noted above, 4 ' the Supreme Court of Michigan emulated Ray's prod-
uct liability rationale in Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 1 9 but,
instead of adopting the product line exception, chose to expand the de
facto merger exception. 150 In no way can these examples of recogni-
tion of the product line exception be designated as overwhelming. 15'
Yet, both the very definite advantages as well as the negative aspects
of this theory should be considered.
IV. PRODUCT LINE LIABILITY: "PROS AND CONS"
The difficulty encountered by courts in determining whether or not
to impose product line liability is that they are analyzing and balanc-
ing two competing policy goals from two separate and distinct bodies
of law.' 52 The corporate common law on the one side seeks to ensure
the orderly transfer of assets in a market economy, 53 while the tort
law on the other seeks to compensate the injured victim of a damaging
event.'54 In other words, the courts are confronted with a classic ex-
147. See Schumacher, 451 N.E.2d at 198 (N.Y. 1983)("We do not adopt the rule of [Ray]
but note that [it is] factually distinguishable in any event.").
148. See supra text accompanying notes 104-14.
149. 244 N.W.2d 873 (Mich. 1976).
150. See id. at 883. The Turner court cited Ray's application of tort law with approval,
but made no comment as to the adoption of the product line exception. See id. at 879 n.4, 882
(Ray part of trend toward finding successor liability).
151. See, e.g., Tucker v. Paxson Mach. Co., 645 F.2d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1981)(product
line liability not part of Missouri law); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443, 448 (7th Cir.
1977)(neither Indiana nor Ohio follow successor liability); Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709
S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(adopting product line
theory a legislative choice); Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(Oudicial restraint appropriate in considering such a radi-
cal theory); see also Sell, Successor Corporation's Liability for Defective Products of Its Trans-
feror-The Product Line Exception, 4 J.L. & CoM. 65, 71 (1984)(thirteen states have
considered product line liability, two have adopted such theory, two have left the issue un-
resolved, nine have rejected the theory).
152. A number of legal writers have addressed the issue of conflict between corporate and
product liability law. See generally Fegan, Successor Corporations and Strict Liability in
Tort-A Convergence of Two Opposing Doctrines, 69 ILL. B.J. 142 (1980); Note, Continued
Expansion of Corporation Successor Liability in the Products Liability Arena, 58 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 1117, 1117-21 (1982); Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability
and Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 446-47 (1982).
153. See Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of Seller's Products Liabilities in As-
sets Acquisitions, 10 TOLEDO L. REV. 1, 4 & n.5 (1978)(successor non-liability matter of "eco-
nomic utility").
154. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984).
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ample of adding up apples and oranges. It is for this reason that the
courts should carefully analyze the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the arguments both for and against adoption of this new theory.
The courts imposing product line liability and those courts rejecting
such liability have advanced numerous legal and policy arguments to
support their respective positions.' 55 They nevertheless follow similar
patterns of reasoning.
A. Product Liability Analysis. Pro
The major, and perhaps the strongest, argument in support of the
product line exception was advanced in the Ray decision. The Cali-
fornia court, always a pioneer in the field of strict products liability, 56
reasoned that a plaintiff is entitled to seek compensation from a suc-
cessor corporation because he has no remedy against the dissolved
predecessor. 157 As we have seen, corporate law imposes no duty upon
a dissolved corporation to provide for future product liability claims.
The result of this rule is that the cost of a defective product is shifted
totally to the injured plaintiff.'58 The transferring of economic bur-
155. See, e.g., Andrews v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 369 So. 2d 731, 785 (Ala. 1977); Pelc
v. Bendix Mach. Tool Corp., 314 N.W.2d 614, 620 (Mich. Ct. App. 198 1)(Alabama and Mich-
igan reject product line theory because each state bases product liability recovery on negli-
gence, not strict liability theory). Some courts reject the product line theory because it holds
companies liable for defective products which they did not manufacture. See Manh Hung
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1108-09 (I1. App. Ct. 1982); Jones
v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982). Similarly, other courts
reject the product line exception because the successor corporation was not in a position to
eliminate the risk of injury, and such liability would defeat one policy consideration supporting
strict products liability-modification of the manufacturer's behavior. See Bernard v. Kee
Mfg., 409 So. 2d 1047, 1050 (Fla. 1982)(court also apprehensive about impact of product line
liability on small business, particularly regarding insurability against such liability). One fed-
eral court, interpreting Texas law, concluded that product line liability was too radical a de-
parture from Texas products liability law. See Rhynes v. Branick Mfg. Corp., 629 F.2d 409,
410 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 759 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(decision whether to adopt product line exception proper
for legislature, not judiciary).
156. The California Supreme Court was the first to impose strict products liability in
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963). This decision was made the year
before the American Law Institute adopted the concept of strict products liability in section
402A of the Restatement of Torts. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 694 (5th ed. 1984).
157. See Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977).
158. See id. at 10; see also Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate
Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 601 (1977)(in-
jured person without adequate remedy under traditional rule).
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dens to the injured victim not only violates fundamental doctrines of
tort law,' 5 9 but also contradicts one of the fundamental precepts of
strict products liability.
60
Traditionally, another major goal of strict products liability law has
been to spread the cost of the individual plaintiff's injury to the entire
group of consumers.1 6' A purchasing corporation could accomplish
this by obtaining liability insurance to cover contingent liability for
any defective products placed into the stream of commerce by the
predecessor. 162 By simply adjusting the purchase price of the assets
downward to reflect the cost of such insurance, the purchasing corpo-
ration would shift a portion of the burden of insurance costs onto the
business entity now dissolved. 163 As such, an equitable distribution of
costs between both corporations would be achieved, and one of the
reasons for imposing strict products liability"6 would be satisfied.
Three other basic policy considerations also support a products lia-
bility analogy. First, concerns for public health and safety demand
that the law accommodate society by compensating plaintiffs injured
159. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984)(discussing tort principles).
160. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963)(purpose of
strict tort liability is to ensure that cost of injuries resulting from defective product borne by
manufacturers rather than "powerless" injured person); see also McKisson v. Sales Affiliates,
416 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. 1967)(adopting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A
(1965)).
161. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)(Traynor, J.,
concurring)(manufacturer should insure against costs of injuries caused by defective products
as cost of doing business).
162. Some courts imposing liability on successor corporations have presumed the succes-
sors' ability to insure against loss. See, e.g., Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154 (1st
Cir. 1974)("hazards of insuring for risk better borne by manufacturer than consumer); Shan-
non v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D. Mich. 1974)(in practice, acquiring
corporation continues predecessor's insurance); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal.
1977)(Alad II's capacity to insure same as Alad I's). But see Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson
Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)(cannot assume availability of
product liability insurance).
163. Some commentators have suggested the alternative of requiring the seller to indem-
nify the buyer for future product liability claims. E.g., Heitland, Survival of Products Liability
Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 489, 498 (1979). This can be accomplished by
placing a portion of the purchase price into an interest-bearing escrow account as security. Id.;
see also Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Corpora-
tions, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 458-59 (1982)(discussing disadvantages of escrow accounts).
164. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment a (1965)(putting product
in stream of commerce implies special responsibility to consuming public).
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by unreasonably dangerous products. 165  Second, the risk of injury
should be placed on the business entity because, whether the product
is defective or not, it is the corporation that profits from the sale.
166
Third, the entity placing a product into the stream of commerce,
rather than the injured plaintiff, is in a better position to discover and
correct potential defects.
1 67
Judicial emphasis on public safety encourages manufacturers to im-
prove the quality and safety of their goods. Having the threat of strict
products liability over them provides companies with an incentive to
invest more in safety research and in quality control of their produc-
tion. 168 The ultimate result is that fewer defective and unsafe prod-
ucts will be placed into the stream of commerce.1 69 These broad
concerns of public policy stressing health and safety should not be
diminished simply because one manufacturer has transferred its oper-
ation to another going concern. The bottom line for proponents of
the product line exception is that health and safety goals are best
served by imposing the same strict liability standards on a successor
corporation as would have been imposed upon its predecessor.
170
A second products liability policy argument is based on the fact
that the sale of a product earns a profit for the manufacturer. Since
strict products liability seeks to shift the cost of injuries caused by
165. See Note, Expanding the Products Liability of Successor Corporations, 27 HASTINGS
L.J. 1305, 1323 (1976).
166. See id. (corporation enjoying commercial advantage should bear losses as cost of
business).
167. See Note, Continued Expansion of Corporate Successor Liability in the Products Lia-
bility Arena, 58 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1117, 1127 (1982)(manufacturer best able to prevent
risks).
168. Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628 (N.Y. 1973); Ellithorpe v. Ford Motor Co.,
503 S.W.2d 516, 521 (Tenn. 1973); see also 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 117 (1881)("saf-
est way to secure care is to throw the risk upon the person who decides what precautions shall
be taken"); cf Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 441 (Cal. 1944)(Traynor, J.,
concurring)("It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products having defects
that are a menace to the public.").
169. A basic policy justification for strict products liability is its deterrent effect. Two
arguments against this view are that (1) liability based on negligence is an equally effective
deterrent, and (2) strict liability will discourage experimentation with new products. See W.
KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 98, at 693 (5th ed. 1984).
170. One author has advised acquiring corporations to "attempt to discover the extent of
danger created by the [predecessor's] products. . ." and to advise past buyers of those hazards
in order to protect themselves against future liability. Heitland, Survival of Products Liability
Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 489, 498 (1979). The fact that legal advisors are
giving such advice seems to provide some support for the deterrent theory.
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defective products to those parties that economically benefit from the
product's sale, the maker and seller should bear the burden of a prod-
uct's attendant risks. 7 ' Moreover, a successor corporation which
continues to produce and market the identical product, using the
same trade name or trademark, realizes a benefit in the form of "good
will" and reputation generated from prior sales.'7 2 New sales are gen-
erated for the succeeding company in part because consumers recog-
nize the trade name as that of a reliable, quality product. A successor
corporation likely will attempt to capitalize on that reputation by
holding itself out as a continuing enterprise having all of the knowl-
edge and expertise of the predecessor. 173 A purchasing corporation in
many cases deliberately and meticulously creates the impression of an
on-going business, and consumers are unaware of any changes in cor-
porate ownership. From the consumer's perspective, there is no dif-
ference in either product or manufacturer. 174 This perception works
to the advantage of the current manufacturer, who enjoys more sales
and more profits because of consumers' continuing reliance on the
reputation of the product. 175 Advocates of the product line exception
contend that the benefit thus derived justifies placing the correspond-
ing burden of liability on the succeeding entity.' 76 The same rationale
which supports the imposition of strict products liability on the man-
ufacturer who gleans profits from the sale also supports the imposi-
tion of product line liability on the successor corporation.177 If one
has made a profit, he should bear the cost of injuries caused by the
product.
The third justification for a products liability analysis is that the
171. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963).
172. E.g., Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D.Mich. 1974);
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10, 11 (Cal. 1977); Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244
N.W.2d 873, 882 (Mich. 1976).
173. See Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1151-53 (1st Cir. 1974)(successor exploits
good will accumulated by past sales of products).
174. See id. at 1152.
175. See Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 882 (general discussion of business and sales advantages
of continuity of enterprise).
176. See Hill, Products Liability of A Successor Corporation-Acquisition of "Bad Will"
with Good Will, 32 DEE. L.J. 55, 59-60 (1983)(citing Ray, 560 P.2d at 10-11).
177. This conclusion is founded on the view that one who voluntarily places himself in
the shoes of a predecessor should accept the burdens as well as the benefits of the transaction,
and is as capable as the predecessor of protecting against unreasonable claims. See Ray, 560
P.2d at 10; Ramirez v. Amsted Indus., 431 A.2d 811, 816 (N.J. 1981); Dawejko v. Jorgensen
Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 108 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)(citing Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1154).
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manufacturer is in the best position to discover potential defects."I
The manufacturer is also in the best position to estimate the product's
cost and, if the product does cause injury, to shift and spread the
burden of this damaging event among all consumers. 179 The same
inferences apply to a successor corporation: Having voluntarily
placed itself in the same position as the predecessor, the successor
should have the same ability not only to discover defects but also to
estimate costs and shift the burden of injuries to the consuming pub-
lic.' 8 ° The successor also should be capable of economically protect-
ing itself from any contingent liability attributable to the predecessor's
product. 8 '
B. Product Liability Analysis: Con
While its advocates argue that product line liability is merely a logi-
cal extension of the law of strict products liability, its opponents con-
tend that the underlying policy goals are impracticable and
unworkable in the realm of corporate acquisitions.'82 For example, a
principle argument against holding a successor corporation liable for
injuries caused by its predecessor's defective products is that such lia-
bility restricts the free availability and transferability of corporate as-
sets. 83 Critics of product line liability complain that accurately
predicting the extent of future claims resulting from defective prod-
ucts already placed into the stream of commerce is virtually impossi-
ble 184 and prevents a reasonable determination of a purchase price for
178. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (Cal. 1944)(Traynor, J.,
concurring)(manufacturer can anticipate hazards); see also Comment, A Restoration of Cer-
tainty: Strict Products Liability and Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 442-43
(1982)(often only manufacturer in position to detect defects)(citing Codling v. Paglia, 298
N.E.2d 622, 627 (N.Y. 1973)).
179. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 692-93 (5th ed. 1984)(discussing "risk-bearing eco-
nomic" theory).
180. E.g., Ray, 560 P.2d at 10; Ramirez, 431 A.2d at 816; Dawejko, 434 A.2d at 108.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 161-63. See generally Heitland, Survival of Prod-
ucts Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 489, 497-99 (1979)(enumerating
techniques to avoid successor liability); Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products
Liability and Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 458-60 (1982)(discussing methods
of self-protection for successors).
182. See generally Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and
Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 458-61 (1982)(criticizing successor liability).
183. Id. at 458. But see Shannon v. Samuel Langston Co., 379 F. Supp. 797, 802 (W.D.
Mich. 1974)(liability would not result in artificial restraints on corporate acquisitions).
184. See Note, Ray v. Alad Corporation: Imposing Liability on the Successor Corporation
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the seller's business.'"5 Predicting and guarding against future liabil-
ity, however, is part of the regular conduct of business.'86 Predicting
liability should be no less certain when one entity is acquiring the
assets of another; if the predecessor was capable of estimating future
liabilities, the successor should be equally competent.I 7 Furthermore,
the necessity of predicting this kind of potential loss has had no ap-
parent effect in transactions where one corporation's assets are trans-
ferred to another corporation by means of a statutory merger or
consolidation.' Since the difficulty of determining future claims re-
sulting from defective products has had no effect on one type of cor-
porate transfer, it should have no effect on a different type of
transfer.8 9 The alleged difficulty of calculating a suitable purchase
price is apparently not great enough to impose serious limitations on
the proposed transferability of corporate assets. Therefore, one of the
major arguments against product line liability is defeated.
Arguing further against the product line exception, some courts
and commentators contend that the corporate purchaser is entitled to
the same protections as a bona fide purchaser of property.' 9° These
for the Defective Products of the Predecessor Corporation, 15 CAL. W.L. REV. 338, 357-58
(1979)(amount of contingent liabilities cannot be accurately determined in corporate
negotiations).
185. See Recent Cases, Strict Product Liability-Successor Corporations Are Strictly Lia-
ble in Tort for Defective Products Manufactured by Its Predecessor Corporation, 18 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 556, 558 (1978)(Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977) will require succes-
sor corporations to calculate cost of strict products liability in tort for predecessor's products
when determining purchase price). At least one court has rejected the product line theory
because it did not want corporate acquisitions to become "traps for unwary successor corpora-
tions." See Woody v. Combustion Eng'g, 463 F. Supp. 817, 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
186. Any manufacturer must be able to calculate the probability of product liability. The
predecessor would have had the "burden of potential liability" had it not sold its business.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10-11 (Cal. 1977). An opponent of successor liability stated
this very simply: "Obviously, a corporation is subject to liability for defective products which
it manufactures and sells itself, regardless of whether it is a predecessor or successor corpora-
tion." Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982).
187. As noted in Ray, the successor has purchased from the predecessor the means and
sources for determining liability. Ray, 560 P.2d at 10; see also Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d
1145, 1154 (1st Cir. 1974)(where resources, employees, and facility identical, ability to predict
should be identical).
188. See Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 882-83 (Mich. 1976)(not-
ing lack of logic in view that potential liability unmanageable in assets sales but not in merg-
ers)(citing Chase v. Michigan Tel. Co., 80 N.W. 717, 719 (1899)).
189. See id. at 882.
190. See, e.g., Kloberdanz v. Joy Mfg., 288 F. Supp. 817, 820-21 (D. Colo. 1968); Pierce
v. Riverside Mortgage Sec. Co., 77 P.2d 226, 230-31 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1938); American Ry.
Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 228 S.W. 433, 437 (Ky. 1920); see also Comment, The Exten-
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authorities assert, for example, that the purpose of the traditional cor-
porate law rule was to provide security from unknown perils."19 The
concept of bona fide purchaser, however, historically was designed to
protect the uninformed and unsophisticated buyer. 19 2 A business en-
tity familiar with the intricacies of commercial transactions cannot be
said to fall into this category. This is especially true since, in many
instances, a transfer of assets is specifically structured to avoid liabil-
ity for injuries caused by defective products already in the stream of
commerce. 9 3 Therefore, the analogy fails to provide a basis for per-
suasive argument.
Another objection to the product line concept is that it is a major
expansion of strict liability theory uncontemplated by the writers of
the Restatement of Torts. 94 Section 402A, 95 for example, specifi-
sion of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10
LoY. L.A.L. REV. 584, 591 (1977); cf Recent Cases, Strict Product Liability-Successor Cor-
porations Are Strictly Liable in Tort for Defective Products Manufactured by Its Predecessor
Corporation, 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 556, 558 (1978)(Ray should not extend to purchaser
which continues trade name, but not product line). A corporate purchase is generally charac-
terized as "bona fide" where the consideration is adequate to satisfy the seller's debts. E.g.,
Jacobs v. Lakewood Aircraft Serv., 512 F. Supp. 176, 180 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Kloberdanz, 288 F.
Supp. at 821 & n.2. A transferee must also be without notice of prior claims. Frankish v.
Federal Mortgage Co., 87 P.2d 90, 97 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1939). Under California law, the
surviving corporation in a merger, for example, is presumed to have notice of creditors' claims,
so that bona fide purchaser status in a merger context is impossible to achieve. Comment, The
Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel,
10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 591-92 n.42 (1977)(citing Treadaway v. Camellia Convalescent
Hosps., 118 Cal. Rptr. 341, 348 (Ct. App. 1974)). The rules of corporate law pertaining to
successor liabilities within the context of corporate acquisitions have been influenced signifi-
cantly by concerns for creditor protection. Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate
Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L. REV. 86, 91 (1975). See generally Comment, The Extension of Prod-
ucts Liability to Corporate Asset Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L.
REV. 584, 591-92 (1977)(discussing creditor's security in sale of assets).
191. See Note, Assumption of Products Liability in Corporate Acquisitions, 55 B.U.L.
REV. 86, 91 (1975)(successor non-liability facilitates sales of corporate assets by permitting
avoidance of contigent or unknown liabilities).
192. The great protections afforded the bona fide purchaser of property were evolved not
under the common law, but in a commercial setting under the Uniform Commercial Code.
Under the common law, between an innocent purchaser and an innocent owner of property,
the owner prevailed. See generally C. SMITH & R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY 480 (2d ed. 1971).
193. See Turner v. Bituminous Casaulty Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 880 (Mich. 1976)(where
avoidance of product liability only reason to choose cash purchase of assets, non-liability under
corporate law rule not in public interest).
194. This argument is founded upon a literal reading of section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which states that "[o]ne who sells any product .. is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the.., user or consumer .... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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cally states that strict liability is to be imposed on "[o]ne who sells" an
unreasonably dangerous and defective product. 19 6  Opponents of suc-
cessor liability argue that since the defendant corporation did not
manufacture or market the product in question, it should not be held
liable for the alleged injuries.1 97 This argument is simple and straight-
forward: since the successor corporation did not "sell" the product
causing the injury, it should not be held liable. A literal interpretation
of section 402A tends to support this view. 198 The Restatement, how-
ever, is not substantive law and need not be strictly construed. Re-
statement formulations may be adapted judicially to accommodate
the dynamic policy considerations underlying modern tort law. This
is exemplified in many cases construing this very same phrase-"one
who sells"-to mean "one who places into the stream of com-
merce."' 99 As a result of this construction, individuals who have not
TORTS § 402A (1965). Numerous courts have adopted this approach. E.g., Manh Hung
Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (111. App. Ct. 1982); Jones v.
Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982); Griggs v. Capitol Mach.
Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 292 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
195. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
196, See id. The Restatement provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Id.
197. Some courts contend that the successor did not create the risk and should not be
held liable for the harm caused by its predecessor's products. E.g., Leannais v. Cincinnati,
Inc., 565 F.2d 437, 439 (7th Cir. 1977); Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp.,
433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (111. App. Ct. 1982); Jones v. Johnson Mach. & Press Co., 320 N.W.2d
481, 484 (Neb. 1982).
198. See supra text accompanying note 194.
199. See First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966, 967 (Ala.
1978).
Not only does decisional authority emphasize the stream of commerce' in fixing liability,
but it is also the more reasonable view. When a product is placed in the stream of com-
merce,' the marketing cycle as it were, whether by demonstration, lease, free sample or
sale, the doctrine should attach. In each of these situations the profit motive of the manu-
facturer is apparent whether or not a sale' in the strict sense takes place. Moreover, the
manufacturer who enters the market is in a better position to know and correct defects in
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sold but instead have rented,2° or released the product into the mar-
ketplace by bailment, 20 1 free sample,20 2 or otherwise have been held
strictly liable for injuries caused by defects in such products. In any
case, the true issue is whether the policy considerations supporting
section 402A 213 outweigh the literal language of the Restatement. If
so, then a literal interpretation which frustrates the policy goals is
contradictory and undesirable. Viewed from this perspective, the
product line theory does not expand strict product liability, but in-
stead furthers its goals. Again, the argument fails.
The contention that a corporation should not be held liable for
what it could not control may also be answered by reference to section
402A. Strict products liability is not based upon fault,204 but instead
upon the premise that those parties who receive the benefits of selling
a product should also accept responsibility for harm caused by that
product.20 5 While this view is arguably unfair to the successor corpo-
ration, denying the liability of a successor corporation is equally, if
not more, harsh to the injured plaintiff portrayed in our initial scena-
rio. As previously mentioned, successor non-liability violates one of
the fundamental doctrines of tort law 2°6 and contradicts one of the
fundamental precepts of strict products liability 207 when it fails to
compensate this injured person.
Finally, opponents of successor liability strenuously assert that,
his product and as between him and his prospective consumers should bear the risk of
injury to those prospective consumers when any such defects enter the market
uncorrected.
Id. at 968.
200. Id. at 967 (citing Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 212 A.2d 769
(N.J. 1965)).
201. Id. (citing Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964)).
202. Id. (citing McKisson v. Sales Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787 (Tex. 1967)).
203. See generally Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV.
1077, 1084-94 (1965).
204. See Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 958 (Md. 1976)(manufacturer's
conduct irrelevant).
[I]n an action founded on strict liability in tort, as opposed to a traditional negligence
action, the plaintiff need not prove any specific act of negligence on the part of the seller.
The relevant inquiry in a strict liability action focuses not on the conduct of the manufac-
turer but rather on the product itself.
Id.
205. Id. at 963.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 158-59.
207. See supra text accompanying note 160.
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contrary to the position of its proponents,2 °8 insurance against liabil-
ity is neither readily attainable nor affordable for some successors.20 9
This would be especially true in situations involving small busi-
nesses.210 If, as the opponents argue, insurance is not available, then
there would be some resulting unfairness to the defendant business
entity. Many courts and commentators have concluded that to deal
fairly with the several policy considerations raised by the issue of in-
surability, state legislatures should resolve the problem z.2 l  Any ques-
tion of fairness to the corporation, however, also raises the question of
fairness to the injured consumer. No one could argue that this indi-
vidual is in a better position to insure himself against such contingen-
cies. Consequently, when we compare the innocent injured victim to
the going business concern which either placed the product into the
stream of commerce or acquired the entity that did, there is no ques-
tion who should bear the burden. Insurable or not, the acquiring
company should pay.
For all the reasons stated, both pro and con, it would seem that the
logical conclusion and the best position for all concerned would be the
adoption of product line liability. The beginning of this discussion
stressed that the difficulty encountered by the courts in determining
whether or not to impose product line liability was that the courts are
208. The court in Ray, for example, assumed that a successor corporation could obtain
insurance to cover contingent liabilities associated with the predecessor's defective products.
Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 9 (Cal. 1977).
209. Tift v. Forage King Indus., 322 N.W.2d 14, 24-25 (Wis. 1982)(Callow, J., dissent-
ing); see also Product Liability Insurance (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Capi-
tal, Investment and Business Opportunities of the House Committee on Small Business, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1977)(testimony of Charles W. Whalen, Jr., Edward W. Pattison, Donald J.
Pease, Joel Pritchard, & Newton I. Steers, Jr.)(product liability premiums increased 5.8 times
more than annual sales between 1970 and 1977); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SMALL Busi-
NESS, 28TH ANNUAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 629, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 167 (1978)(between 1975
and 1977, product liability insurance premiums increased 100 to 1,000 percent).
210. See Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982)(insurance costs make competition difficult for small businesses); see also
Heitland, Survival of Products Liability Claims in Assets Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 489, 497
(1979)(some insurance policies now on "claims made" basis, precluding coverage for claims
after dissolution of predecessor).
211. E.g., Manh Hung Nguyen v. Johnson Mach. & Press Corp., 433 N.E.2d 1104, 1111
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982); Jones v. Johnson Mach. and Press Co., 320 N.W.2d 481, 484 (Neb. 1982);
Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 292-93 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); see also Comment, Products Liability and Successor Corporations: Protecting the Prod-
uct User and the Small Manufacturer Through Increased Availability of Products Liability In-
surance, 13 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1000, 1026 (1980).
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in fact analyzing and balancing two competing policy goals, using two
separate and distinct bodies of law.212 The corporate common law on
the one side seeks to ensure the orderly transfer of assets in a market
economy, while the tort law on the other side seeks to compensate the
injured victim of a damaging event.213 When the strengths and weak-
nesses of product line liability are considered, however, and the func-
tion of the judicial system taken into account, it seems clear that the
time has arrived for implementation of this theory. It is fair, and tak-
ing all factors into consideration, it is a position that best serves soci-
ety, business, and the injured plaintiff.
V. SUCCESSOR LIABILITY IN TEXAS
A. Statutory Authority
Currently, there are three provisions in the Texas Business Corpo-
ration Act which relate to the issue of successor corporation liabil-
ity. 214 The first of these, article 5.06, entitled "Effect of Merger or
Consolidation of Domestic Corporation," states:
Such surviving or new corporation shall thenceforth be responsible and
liable for all liabilities and obligations of each of the corporations so
merged or consolidated; and any claim existing or action or proceeding
pending by or against any of such corporations may be prosecuted as if
such merger or consolidation had not taken place, or such surviving or
new corporation may be substituted in its place.215
This passage is typical of most statutory enactments in the United
States today in that it provides that the "surviving" or "new" corpo-
ration may be held responsible for the obligations of the merging
entities.216
212. See generally Comment, The Extension of Products Liability to Corporate Asset
Transferees-An Assault on Another Citadel, 10 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 584, 584-85 (1977)(corpo-
rate law supports "predictability" in business transactions while product liability law shifts
losses from the consumer); Comment, A Restoration of Certainty: Strict Products Liability and
Successor Corporations, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 446-47 (1982)(corporate rule promotes com-
merce while tort law compensates victims).
213. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (5th ed. 1984); Kadens, Practitioner's Guide to Treatment of
Seller's Products Liabilities in Assets Acquisitions, 10 TOLEDO L. REV. 1, 4 & n.5 (1978).
214. TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. arts. 5.06, 5.10, 7.12 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
215. Id. art. 5.06(A)(5).
216. See e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-076(B)(5)(1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32,
para. 11.50(5) (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-14-6(E) (1983). Many state corpo-
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The second statutory provision, article 7.12, entitled "Limited Sur-
vival After Dissolution," is also typical in that it provides that ex-
isting obligations may not be avoided by dissolving a corporation.217
The statute states that the mere dissolution of a company does not
terminate or impair any existing remedy available against the business
entity prior to that date. 218  Article 7.12 goes on to provide that the
dissolved corporation remains liable for such existing claims for three
years after the date of dissolution.2 9 This would mean, however, that
if the claim arises after the date of dissolution, or if the claim is not
made within three years, the claimant would be completely barred
from any recovery.
The third and final relevant section of the Act, article 5.10, entitled
"Disposition of Assets Requiring Special Authorization of Sharehold-
ers," explicitly states that de facto mergers and consolidations are not
authorized under Texas law.22° Consequently, at least one of the ave-
nues open to injured consumers seeking a remedy in most jurisdic-
tions is closed.2 21 In Texas, apparently, unless the acquisition is a
statutory merger or consolidation, a corporation which acquires the
business operation of another is liable only for those obligations which
ration statutes are patterned after the Model Business Corporation Act, which provides in
pertinent part:
When a merger takes effect ... the surviving corporation has all liabilities of each corpo-
ration party to the merger ....
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 11.06(a)(3) (1984). But see Hamilton, Reflections of
a Reporter, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1455, 1455 n.4 (1985)(influential states such as Delaware, Califor-
nia, New York, and Pennsylvania developed original state corporation statutes, reducing influ-
ence of model act).
217. See TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 7.12(A)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1988).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id. art. 5.10(B). The pertinent language states:
A disposition of any, all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a corporation,
whether or not it requires the special authorization of the shareholders of the corporation,
effected under Section A of this article or under Article 5.09 of this Act or otherwise:
(1) is not considered to be a merger or consolidation pursuant to this Act or otherwise;
and
(2) Except as otherwise expressly provided by another statute, does not make the acquir-
ing corporation responsible or liable for any liability or obligation of the selling corpora-
tion that the acquiring corporation did not expressly assume.
Id.; see also Mudgett v. Paxson Mach. Co., 709 S.W.2d 755, 758 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(de facto merger doctrine not recognized under Texas law).
221. See generally supra text accompanying notes 69-117 (discussing de facto merger or
consolidation).
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it expressly assumes. 22 2
B. Case Authority
Because of the relative clarity of the Texas Business Corporation
Act, the Texas judiciary has been unwilling to question the legisla-
ture's intent or to deviate from the statutory limitations. Texas
courts, for example, do not recognize the de facto merger. 223 At least
two courts of appeals also expressly rejected the product line excep-
tion.22 4 In the leading case of Griggs v. Capitol Machine Works,2 25 the
plaintiff claimed to have been injured by a defective product manufac-
tured by Capitol Machine Works.226 Three years before the injury
occurred, the company had voluntarily dissolved and transferred all
of its assets to another corporation. 227 The injured plaintiff, however,
proceeded to trial and pleaded four causes of action, one of which was
based upon the product line theory of recovery.228 The Austin Court
of Appeals stated that the issue involved was whether:
the common law affirmatively impose[s] upon a corporation strict liabil-
ity for personal injuries caused by an unreasonably dangerous product
manufactured and sold by another corporation, when the former has
purchased all the assets and going business of the latter and continues
to make and supply the same product line as that which includes the
unreasonably dangerous product.
229
The court then took note of the Ray,230 Ramirez,231 and Dawejko
232
222. Decisions are conflicting as to the issue of whether or not "mere continuation" is
accepted in Texas. Compare Western Resources Life Ins. Co. v. Gerhardt, 553 S.W.2d 783,
786 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(recognizing "mere continuation" excep-
tion to traditional corporate law rule) with Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 758 (since de facto merger
exception contrary to public policy so is mere continuation exception because it is "even more
liberal").
223. Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 758; Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 292
(Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also supra text accompanying notes 220-22.
224. Although the Texas Supreme Court has yet to rule on the issue of product line
liability, two different courts of appeals have rejected it. See Mudgett, 709 S.W.2d at 759;
Griggs, 690 S.W.2d at 294.
225. 690 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
226. See id. at 288 (product causing injury not described in court's opinion).
227. Id. at 288-89.
228. See id. at 289; see also id. at 291 (product line theory is "imputed" liability).
229. Id. at 290-91.
230. See supra text accompanying notes 120-39.
231. See supra text accompanying note 141.
232. See supra text accompanying notes 141-44.
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decisions and the social policies underlying the theory of strict prod-
ucts liability. 233 The court's conclusion was that the product line the-
ory is a "judicially created . . . common law tort" 234 and that the
analysis upon which the theory is founded is "light indeed and the
scope ... astonishing.
'" 235
The Griggs decision, which strictly interpreted the language of sec-
tion 402A, was based on three general principles. First, the court rea-
soned that the product line theory advances none of the social policies
underlying strict products liability; instead, the theory contradicts the
fundamental limitation which the Restatement imposes upon this type
of situation.236 In other words, the court was adhering to the lan-
guage of section 402A which states that liability is applicable only to
"one who sells any product." Construing the rule otherwise, in the
court's view, would be tantamount to imposing upon the successor
the legal duty to prevent the injury.2 37 Secondly, the court asserted
that its decision was controlled by Texas precedent.238 Interestingly,
233. See Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 291-92 (Tex. App.-Austin
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(applying policy considerations to question of successor liability).
234. Id. at 291.
235. Id. The court noted that no social policy is advanced by imposing liability upon a
party who did not put a product "into the channels of commerce." Id. The court further
complained that such a theory could equally impose liability upon corporate directors, officers,
employees, suppliers, or indeed any persons "vaguely" found to benefit from the predecessor's
good will, to control the risk, or to have the ability to purchase product liability insurance. Id.
at 292.
236. Id. The court stated:
Where then may one find the real basis for imposing tort liability upon a person who
could not possibly conduct himself so as to avoid the specific injury suffered by a particu-
lar plaintiff? The reported decisions adopting the "product line" theory supply no real or
explicit basis apart from their misplaced reliance upon § 402A of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts. Really, those decisions merely declare a result. The liability they find sim-
ply floats between earth and sky, buoyed perhaps by the salutary policy that one should
have reparation for his injuries but disregarding nevertheless the fundamental proposition
that there is no pre-existing legal principle declaring that liability for such reparation shall
descend and fasten upon the purchasing corporation, as opposed to any other person in
the universe. Recognizing the want of legal precedent, they embrace but find rejection in
§ 402A of the Restatement. We find in such decisions patently insufficient analysis and
justification for the raw judicial legislation they illustrate so vividly.
Id. at 293.
237. See id. at 292 ("legal duty" is duty to make one whole).
238. See id. at 293. The court cited as "controlling" precedent Denison Light & Power
Co. v. Patton, 105 Tex. 621, 154 S.W. 540 (1913); Mexican Nat'l Const. Co. v. Middlegge, 75
Tex. 634, 13 S.W. 257 (1890); Southwestern Gas, Light & Power Co. v. Jay, 275 S.W. 735 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1925, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See id. at 293-94 (purchaser not a proper defend-
ant for tortious acts committed prior to purchase).
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these allegedly binding Texas cases were decided forty years before
the inception of section 402A.23 9 Finally, the court concluded that
since public policy and not legal theory served as the analytical basis
for product line liability, the issue more properly should be addressed
by the legislature.2"
Shortly after Griggs, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals, in Mud-
gett v. Paxson Machine Company,241 was confronted with the same
issue.242 Deferring to Griggs, the Mudgett court rejected not only the
product line theory,243 but also the de facto merger and mere contin-
uation exceptions to the traditional corporate law rule of successor
non-liability. 24" The court reasoned that "the successor cannot be
said to have created the risk associated with a product manufactured
by its predecessor,"" and that if such a "far-reaching change" is re-
quired, the legislature rather than the judiciary should make the
change.246 Once again a Texas court opted to have the entire matter
decided by the legislative branch of government.
These two cases make it clear that under the present state of Texas
law, a corporation which acquires another is liable only for those obli-
gations which it expressly assumes, unless an acquisition is a statutory
merger or consolidation.247 Considering the reasoning of the courts in
these decisions, it is not surprising that Texas courts have rejected
product line liability.248 Their argument that numerous competing
public policy issues are involved and that the problem should be ad-
dressed by the legislature is a persuasive one. Since there are indeed
numerous economic and social issues involved, the legislature proba-
239. The American Law Institute accepted section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts in 1964. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON, & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 98, at 964 (5th ed. 1984).
240. See Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 & n.5 (Tex. App.-Austin
1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(judiciary "uniquely ill-suited" to address successor product liability
issue). But cf Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 429 (Tex. 1984)(supreme court
created comparative causation due to legislative inaction).
241. 709 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
242. See id. at 758 (plaintiff asked court to adopt product line liability).
243. Id. at 759.
244. Id. at 758 (de facto and mere continuation exceptions contrary to public policy).
245. Id. at 759.
246. Id.
247. See id. at 758-59; Griggs v. Capitol Mach. Works, 690 S.W.2d 287, 294 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see also TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 5.10(B)(2)
(Vernon Supp. 1988).
248. See generally supra text accompanying notes 236-40, 245-46.
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bly can address the issue of successor liability more effectively than
the judiciary. There is, however, one important aspect to this position
that must be addressed. If the legislature fails to act, what happens to
the injured plaintiff?
VI. CONCLUSION
An individual injured by a defective product placed into the stream
of commerce must be compensated for the damages sustained.g4 9
This is a basic tenet of tort and product liability law. The Texas Leg-
islature should enact a statute which effectively balances the compet-
ing corporate and tort considerations discussed above and, at the
same time, formulate an equitable means for allowing injured parties
to receive adequate compensation. If, however, the legislature fails to
act, it would leave "the supreme court no reasonable alternative ex-




"Sooner or later, and the sooner the better, we must bring products
liability cases within a manageable format. '251  It is time not only to
recognize the changing marketplace illustrated in our initial scenario,
but also to take note of the resulting impact that this change has
brought upon the individual consumer.252 The product line theory of
liability would serve this function as a logical extension of present
product liability law. Furthermore, to deny the adequate redress of
an injury solely on the basis of a "corporate technicality" is the very
antithesis of the function of modern day courts. In following this
present course, we are denying injured plaintiffs their day in court.253
249. This philosophy pervades the entire specter of American tort law.
250. Edgar, Products Liability in Texas, 11 TEX. TECH L. REV. 23, 50 (1979)(author
calling for adoption of comparative negligence in Texas strict products liability cases).
251. Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 751 (Tex. 1980)(Pope, J., con-
curring)(misuse of a product is in fact contributory negligence and as such should diminish an
individual's recovery in a strict products liability suit).
252. The initial scenario presented illustrates how in some cases an individual may have
no cause of action for injuries sustained from a defective product placed into the stream of
commerce.
253. Denying an injured plaintiff access to the courts deprives him of due process. See
generally Note, The Right ofAccess to Civil Courts Under State Constitutional Law: An Imped-
iment to Modern Reforms, or a Receptacle of Important Substantive and Procedural Rights? 13
RUTGERS L.J. 399 (1982). Lack of access to the courts may also violate the open courts doc-
trine. See Neagle v. Nelson, 685 S.W.2d 11, 12 (Tex. 1985)(statute of limitations precluding
plaintiff from bringing suit for sponge left in abdomen more than two years after surgery was
unconstitutional as violative of Texas's open courts doctrine). The Texas Constitution provides
in pertinent part: "All courts shall be open, and every person for an injury done him, in his
1988]
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For all of these reasons, it seems that the best solution to this predica-
ment is the adoption in Texas of the product line exception.
lands, goods, person or reputatuion, shall have remedy by due course of law." TEX. CONST.
art. I, § 13. "The open courts provision ... protects a citizen ... from legislative acts that
abridge [an injured party's] right to sue before he has a reasonable opportunity to discover the
wrong and bring suit." Neagle, 685 S.W.2d at 12.
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